High-utility and low-risks synthetic data facilitates microdata dissemination by statistical agencies. In a previous work, we induced privacy protection into any Bayesian data synthesis model by employing a pseudo posterior likelihood that exponentiates each contribution by an observation record-indexed weight ∈ [0, 1], defined to be inversely proportional to the marginal identification risk for that record. The marginal probability of identification risk for a record is composed as the probability that the identity of the record may be disclosed, conditioned on assumptions about a putative intruder's behavior. Relatively risky records with high marginal probabilities of identification risk tend to be isolated from other records. The downweighting of their likelihood contribution will tend to shrink the synthetic data value for those high-risk records, which in turn often tends to increase the isolation of other moderate-risk records. The result is that the identification risk actually increases for some moderate-risk records after risk-weighted pseudo posterior estimation synthesis, compared to * Vassar College, Box 27, 124 Raymond Ave, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, jihu@vassar.edu. an unweighted synthesis; a phenomenon we label "whack-a-mole". This paper constructs a weight for each record from a collection of pairwise identification risk probabilities with other records, where each pairwise probability measures the joint probability of re-identification of the pair of records. The by-record weights constructed from the pairwise identification risk probabilities tie together the identification risk probabilities across the data records and compresses the distribution of by-record risks, which mitigates the whack-a-mole and produces a more efficient set of synthetic data with lower risk and higher utility. We illustrate our method with an application to the Consumer Expenditure Surveys of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. We provide general guidelines to statistical agencies to achieve their desired utility-risk trade-off balance when disseminating public use microdata files through synthetic data.
Introduction
Statistical agencies collect respondent-level data, also known as microdata, from households and business establishments through survey instruments. Based on the collected microdata, agencies disseminate public use microdata files. Quantitative researchers, who require suitable microdata for their research projects, could then gain access to the public use microdata files they need. Findings from these projects in turn help policy makers to make data-driven decisions, and help citizens to understand their communities better. In short, there are great benefits of disseminating microdata to the public by statistical agencies.
However, when disseminating public use microdata files, statistical agencies are under legal obligation to protect privacy and confidentiality of survey respondents (U.S. Title 13 and Title 26). Therefore, the collected microdata has to undergo masking or model smoothing procedures before being released to the public.
Differential privacy is a formal privacy guarantee to add random noise to offer privacy protection. It has been mostly developed on aggregated data format, such as tables (Dwork et al., 2006) . For microdata dissemination, the synthetic data approach is a promising strategy (Rubin, 1993; Little, 1993; Raghunathan et al., 2003; Reiter and Raghunathan, 2007; Drechsler, 2011) . Statistical agencies develop Bayesian statistical models on the original, confidential data. They simulate records (i.e., microdata) from the posterior predictive distribution of the estimated Bayesian models, and release the synthetic microdata to the public. The disseminated synthetic data could preserve high utility, and keep low level of disclosure risks, as demonstrated in the literature, recently by ; Manrique-Vallier and Hu (2018) ; Drechsler and Hu (2018) ; Hu and Savitsky (2018) . Public use synthetic microdata products include the synthetic Longitudinal Business Database (Kinney et al., 2011 (Kinney et al., , 2014 , the Survey of Income and Program Participation (Benedetto et al., 2013) , and OnTheMap (Machanavajjhala et al., 2008) by the U.S. Census Bureau, the IAB Establishment Panel (Drechsler et al., 2008a,b) in Germany, and synthetic business microdata disseminated by the Canadian Research Data Centre Network.
There has been a large amount of work on developing synthesis models to achieve high level of utility of synthetic data, and on developing utility measures of synthetic data (Karr et al., 2006; Snoke et al., 2018) . The literature has largely shown that if the synthesis models, also known as synthesizers, are carefully designed and tailored to the confidential microdata, the simulated synthetic data will maintain high utility.
However, synthetic data with high utility usually comes with high disclosure risks.
When disclosure risks are deemed too high, commonly used strategies include synthesizing more variables, and synthesizing at aggregated level of the variables (Drechsler and Hu, 2018) . Hu and Savitsky (2019) proposed a new approach to offering further privacy protection when disclosure risks of the synthetic data are deemed too high. Starting with a synthesizer producing high utility, their method evaluates the identification risk of each record given the synthetic data. Let IR i denote the identification risk for record i ∈ (1, . . . , n). The IR i is a marginal probability of identification risk for record, i, and the closer the IR i value to 1, the higher the identification risk (i.e. probability of re-identification) of record i. The authors designed a record-indexed weight α i ∈ [0, 1], based on IR i , which is inversely proportional to IR i and bounded between 0 and 1. The vector weights α = (α 1 , · · · , α n ) are subsequently applied to the likelihood function of all n records to form the pseudo posterior,
where γ denotes the model parameters and θ denotes the model hyperparameters.
This construction surgically downweights the likelihood contributions of records with high identification risks (i.e. high IR i produces low α i ), and produces a risk-weighted synthesizer within a pseudo-posterior framework. The proposed risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer successfully produces an overall lower identification risk profile for the entire dataset, compared to the unweighted synthesizer. Such risk reduction comes with a relatively minor utility reduction, which encourages use of a riskweighted pseudo posterior synthesizer to balance the utility-risk trade-off of synthetic data. Hu and Savitsky (2019) demonstrated the performance of the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer in a simulation study, and in an application of synthesizing family income in a sample of the Consumer Expenditure Surveys (CE) at the
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
However, while the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer provides further privacy protection for records with high identification risks by downweighting their likelihood contribution, this risk reduction is achieved by shrinking the synthetic data value for each high-risk record to the main modes of the distribution, which in turn reduces its relative isolation from other records (and we note that it is easier for a putative intruder to identify data records with relatively unique values). The shrinking of a high-risk record towards the main modes, however, may increase the isolation of a relatively moderate-risk record with the result that the identification risk may, actually, increase after re-estimation under the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer as compared to the unweighted synthesizer. We term this undesirable phenomenon as "whack-a-mole", where pseudo posterior unintentionally increases the risk in the synthetic data value of a moderate-risk real data record by increasing its relative isolation. It then becomes difficult to control the overall risk profile of the synthetic data under use of the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer, since the marginal probability of identification risk of some records increases relative to the unweighted synthesizer, simultaneously with a decrease in the identification risk for previously high-risk data records. Figure 1 highlights records (in yellow) in the CE sample, whose marginal probability of identification risk has been increased by 0.25, from the synthetic data drawn under the unweighted synthesizer to the synthetic data drawn under the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer; that is, the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer increases records with moderate levels of identification risks under the unweighted synthesizer to high identification risks, even though it successfully provides higher privacy protection for records with high identification risks, and provides overall lower identification risk profile for the entire dataset. Synthesizer IR
Marginal IR
Figure 1: Scatterplot of marginal probabilities of identification risk of records using the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer (y-axis) and marginal probabilities of identification risk of records using the unweighted synthesizer (x-axis).
Furthermore, Figure 1 also shows that the surgical downweight method proposed by Hu and Savitsky (2019) does not well control the maximum identification risk.
Suppose the statistical agency sets 0.5 as a threshold that no synthetic records should possess identification risk greater than 0.5. As can be seen in the number of records with identification risk exceeding 0.5 on the y-axis, the synthetic data produced by the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer does not satisfy such requirement and, therefore, the set of synthetic data records cannot be released to the public.
In this work, we focus on mitigating the whack-a-mole phenomenon to achieve more satisfactory risk profiles of the simulated synthetic data. Our main strategy formulates the weight for each record by constructing a collection of joint, pairwise probabilities of identification risk for that record with the other data records. Our resulting risk-based weight for each record used in the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer is now based on the collection of pairwise identification risk probabilities, rather than the marginal identification risk probability used in Hu and Savitsky (2019) . Using marginal identification risk probabilities treats each record independently from all others, which induced the unintentional risk increase for some records in the whack-a-mole phenomenon. The use of pairwise identification risk probabilities for formulating by-record weights ties together the downweighting of records that we show in the sequel mitigates the whack-a-mole phenomenon. Pairwise downweighting will not eliminate the whack-a-mole phenomenon entirely, but it substantially mitigates it and does provide further privacy protection with higher utility for the entire sample as compared to the marginal downweight approach. We demonstrate on our CE sample application that our pairwise downweight approach additionally helps to control the maximum identification risks over the data by "compressing" the distribution of the record identification risks. Our use of pairwise identification risk probabilities may be viewed as an adaptation of Williams and Savitsky (2018) from the survey sampling case (where the weights are based on unit inclusion probabilities into a sample of a finite population) to our risk-weighted pseudo posterior framework.
Having established the propriety of our pairwise downweight strategy, we construct and illustrate practical approaches for scaling and shifting the risk-based weights that allow the statistical agency or data-disseminating organization to achieve a desired utility-risk trade-off in the publicly-released synthetic microdata. We illustrate our practical approaches on the CE sample data. Section 1.1 introduces the CE sample, and the goal of synthesizing the highly skewed continuous variable, the family income, of each consumer unit (CU) in the sample. Section 1.2 describes the finite mixture synthesizer developed for the purpose of synthesizing the family income variable, which has been demonstrated to produce synthetic data with high utility. Section 1.3 provides a succinct description for how we compute the identification risk probability of each CU given publicly available synthetic datasets based on assumptions of intruder's knowledge. We subsequently use our approach for computing the identification risk probabilities for the records to compare the performances of our pairwise downweight approach to the marginal downweight approach.
The CE Sample
The CE, published by the BLS, contain data on expenditures, income, and tax statistics about CUs across the U.S.. The CE public-use microdata (PUMD) 1 is publicly available respondent-level data, published by the CE. The CE PUMD has undergone masking procedures to provide privacy protection of survey respondents. Notably, the family income variable, has undergone top-coding, a popular Statistical Disclosure Limitation (SDL) procedure which could result in reduced utility and insufficient privacy protection (An and Little, 2007; Hu and Savitsky, 2019 ).
The CE sample in our application contains n = 6208 CUs, coming from the 2017 1st quarter CE Interview Survey. It includes the family income variable, which is highly right-skewed and deemed sensitive; refer to Figure 2 for its density plot. The CE sample also contains 10 categorical variables, listed in Table 1 . These categorical variables are deemed insensitive, and used as predictors in building a flexible synthesizer for the synthesis of the sensitive family income variable. We next provide details of this synthesizer. 
Finite Mixture Synthesizer
To simulate partially synthetic data for the CE sample, where only the sensitive, continuous family income variable is synthesized, we propose using a flexible, parametric finite mixture synthesizer. As shown in Hu and Savitsky (2019) , their truncated Dirichlet process (TDP) mixture synthesizer produces synthetic CE data with high utility, and can be used for partial synthesis of continuous variable(s) utilizing a number of available predictors.
Equation (2) and Equation (3) present the first two levels of our proposed hierarchical parametric finite mixture synthesizer: y i is the logarithm of the family income for CU i, and x i is the R × 1 predictor vector for CU i. The TDP mixture utilizes a hyperparameter for the maximum number of mixture components (i.e., clusters), K, that is to set to be over-determined to permit the flexible clustering of CUs. A subset of CUs that are assigned to cluster, k, employ the same generating parameters for y, (β * k , σ * k ), that we term a "location". Locations, (β * , σ * ), and the n × 1 vector of cluster indicators, z i ∈ (1, · · · , K), are all sampled for each CU, i ∈ (1, . . . , n).
where the K × R matrix of regression locations, B * = (β * 1 , . . . , β * K ) , denote clusterindexed regression coefficients for R predictors. The (π 1 , . . . , π K ) are, in turn, assigned a sparsity inducing Dirichlet distribution with hyperparameters specified as α/K for α ∈ R + . For brevity and to avoid repeating Hu and Savitsky (2019), we include the details of our prior specification in the Supplementary Material. Here, we describe how to generate partially synthetic data for the CE sample. To implement the TDP synthesizer, we first generate sample values of (π (l) , β * ,(l) , σ * ,(l) ) from the posterior distribution at MCMC iteration l. Secondly, for CU i, we generate cluster assign-
i , from its full conditional posterior distribution given in Hu and Savitsky (2019) using the posterior samples of π (l) . Lastly, we generate synthetic family income for CU i, y * ,(l) i
, from Equation (2) given x i , and samples of z
We perform these draws for all n CUs, and obtain a partially synthetic dataset, Z
at MCMC iteration l. We repeat this process for L times, creating L independent
Marginal Probability of Identification Risk
In Section 2, we define and utilize a collection of pairwise identification risk probabilities for each real data record to construct a weight ∈ [0, 1] to downweight its likelihood contribution for the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer estimated on the real data. We subsequently employ the marginal probability of identification risk for each record from Hu and Savitsky (2019) as a risk measure to assess the risk reduction of the synthetic data produced from a pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer. We select the marginal probability of identification risk as our measure risk because it is based on our assumptions about the behavior of a putative intruder who intends to uncover the identity for a target record.
We provide a succinct description for the marginal probability of identification risk utilized in Hu and Savitsky (2019) , to which we refer the reader for further detail. The intruder has access to L publicly available synthetic datasets,
and suppose the intruder seeks identifies of CUs within synthetic dataset, Z (l) , l ∈
(1, . . . , L). Furthermore, suppose the intruder has access to an external file, which contains a known pattern of the un-synthesized categorical variables,
In addition, we assume that the intruder knows y i , the true family income of
p,i index the collection of CUs sharing the pattern, p, with CU i, in the
Define B(y i , r) as a ball of radius r around the continuous, true family income, y i .
The intruder will regard CUs in M (l)
p,i whose synthetic family income y * ,(l) ∈ B(y i , r)
as candidate records to be identified as CU i. Define the identification risk probability for CU i as: The average of IR (l) i is then taken across L synthetic datasets, and
is used as the final record-level marginal probability of identification risk for CU i.
The choice of r in B(y i , r) is a policy decision set by the statistical agency where smaller values will increase the number of Equation (4)
is more likely to be set to 0 when r is smaller.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the riskweighted pseudo posterior synthesizers within the marginal and pairwise downweight frameworks. In Section 3, we apply the two proposed risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers to the CE sample to generate synthetic family income values, and compare their identification risk and utility profiles. Section 4 presents practical approaches for scaling and shifting the pairwise risk-based weights that allows statistical agencies to achieve their desired utility-risk trade-off balance, demonstrated on the CE sample. The paper concludes with discussion in Section 5.
Risk-weighted Pseudo Posterior Synthesizers
We next discuss two frameworks we propose for constructing risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers through surgical by-record downweighting: i) The marginal downweight framework; ii) The pairwise downweight framework. Within each framework, we construct identification risk probabilities from the confidential (real) data, y, formulate by-record probability-based weights, estimate a risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer from which we draw synthetic data. The resulting risk reduction is measured using the marginal probability of identification risk, outlined in Section 1.3, on the synthetic data.
For illustration purposes, we continue our description with the CE sample. The statistical agency, which is the BLS in the case of CE sample, intends to evaluate the identification risk probability of each CU, using the confidential CE sample. The BLS knows the pattern of categorical variables, X p i ⊆ X i , and y i , the true family income value of CU i, both of which are assumed known by the intruder through an external file.
Marginal downweight framework
Within the marginal downweight framework, marginal identification risk probabilities are calculated on the confidential data using Equation (4) for each record, i ∈ (1, . . . , n); only, here we set all T (l) i = 1, since the calculations are performed on the confidential (real) data, not the resulting synthetic data, such that mixing does not apply. There is no synthetic value to account for when measuring the marginal probability for each record in the confidential data.
We proceed to construct marginal probability-based weight, α m i , that will be utilized to weight the likelihood contribution for CU i, where the weight is based on the marginal identification risk probability, IR i . For CU i, when IR i is large and close to 1, the likelihood contribution of this CU should be substantially downweighted to induce further privacy protection. On the other hand, when IR i is small and close to 0, the likelihood contribution does not need to be downweighted due to its low identification risk. We therefore construct the record-level marginal probabilitybased weights, (α m 1 , · · · , α m n ) to be inversely proportional to the record-level marginal identification risk probabilities, (IR 1 , · · · , IR n ), as:
where c is a constant to scale the amount of downweighting of all CUs. For example, when c = 1, suppose CU i expresses a marginal identification risk probability, IR i = 0.7, its weight is computed α All to say, employment of constant, c, into the marginal probability-based weights formulation in Equation (5) allows the BLS to tune the amount of downweighting to achieve a desired utility-risk trade-off of the synthetic data. We note that Hu and Savitsky (2019) constructed a record-level c i instead of a file-level scalar c. We utilize the scalar c in our CE application as it works well and avoids any distortion in the risk-based weighting that may be implied by using a vector of constants.
Pairwise downweight framework
Within the pairwise downweight framework, we construct a pairwise identification risk probability for each pair of CUs (i, j) that are in the same known pattern of un-synthesized categorical variables. Let M p,(i,j) index the collection of CUs in the confidential data sharing the same pattern, p, with CUs i and j. As in Equation (4), |M p,(i,j) | denotes the number of CUs in the M p,(i,j) collection. As before, B(y i , r) casts a ball of radius r around the true family income of CU i, y i ; similarly, with B(y j , r)
for CU j. We next measure the probability of the event that the family income in the confidential data for each CU, ∈ M p,(i,j) , lies in the intersection defined by y ∈ B(y i , r) and y ∈ B(y j , r), jointly. These intersections are used to construct a joint identification risk probability, IR i,j for the pair of CUs (i, j) as:
The joint identification risk probability, IR i,j = 0 for pairs of CUs (i, j) assigned to different known patterns. It bears mention that constructing the joint measure of isolation in the numerator on the right-hand side of Equation (6) does not arise from an assumption of the intruder identification process as it does in Equation (4). We use these joint identification risk probabilities to next formulate dependent, by-record probability-based weights for the pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer.
We proceed to construct pairwise probability-based weight, α pw i , for CU i, using the collection of pairwise identification risk probabilities, IR i,j , for each i ∈ (1, . . . , n).
Firstly, for each j ∈ M p,(i,j) , define the pairwise weight for CUs (i, j) as:
This definition constructs the pairwise weight, α i,j , to be inversely proportional to the pairwise identification risk probability, IR i,j : higher IR i,j results in lower α i,j , and vice versa. Furthermore,
Secondly, we construct the normalized weight,α i ∈ [0, 1] for CU i, by summing over all α i,j for j = i, and dividing by |M p,i | − 1 to account for the |M p,i | − 1 times
that CU i appears in the combination of pairs in pattern p:
The normalized weight,α i ∈ [0, 1], reflects the amount of downweighting needed for CU i, based on the sum over all pairwise identification risk probabilities associated
To see the inverse proportionality betweenα i and {IR i,j , j = i ∈ M p,i } more clearly, we can rewrite Equation (8) in terms of IR i,j :
Equation (9) shows that when the sum of pairwise identification risk probabilities associated with CU i is high, the normalized weightα i will be low and closer to 0.
Such inverse proportionality is desired, because we want to insert more downweighting on CUs with high identification risks for further privacy protection.
We recall that the whack-a-mole phenomenon arises as distribution mass is shifted in the synthetic data from the real data, due to shrinking of family income values for isolated high-risk records towards the main modes of the distribution. This shrinking of values for high-risk records may in turn reduce the number of records whose values are close to a moderate-risk record (measured for the confidential data), with the result that measured risk in the synthetic data for a record whose risk is measured as moderate under the unweighted synthesizer, may actually increase under the marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer. It is this increase in risks in the synthetic data for moderate-risk records in the confidential data that induces difficulty to control the overall risk level across records.
The set of (α i ) within each pattern are now constructed as dependent. The probability-based weights within the pairwise downweight framework are therefore constructed to reduce the shrinking of high-risk records to leave moderate-risk records more covered in the synthetic data, such that the risks of these records increase less than those in the synthetic data within the marginal downweight framework. We demonstrate in Section 3 that the pairwise downweight framework induces a compression in the distribution of by-record identification risk probabilities (measured as marginal probabilities of identification risk), which is induced by the dependence among the (α i ). This compression in the distribution of identification risk probabilities helps reduce the whack-a-mole phenomenon.
The final pairwise probability-based weight, α pw i , for CU i, is defined as:
where, as with marginal probability-based weights, c allows the scaling of weights to control the utility-risk trade-off.
The pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer has the same form as specified in Hu and Savitsky (2019) for the marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer; namely,
where α pw i ∈ [0, 1], ∀i ∈ (1, . . . , n).
Comparing Marginal and Pairwise Risk-weighted Synthesizers on CE Sample
We utilize three synthesizers on the CE sample to synthesize the sensitive family income variable using 10 categorical predictors: i) The finite mixture unweighted synthesizer from Section 1.2; ii) The marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthe-sizer from Section 2.1; iii) The pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer from Section 2.2.
For the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, we set the scale adjustment c = 1 for comparison. The resulting by-record distribution of identification risks based on the marginal probability of identification risk in Section 1.3 are evaluated for synthetic data drawn under each of three synthesizers. We set the same radius, r = 20% for the two risk-weighted synthesizers, and for evaluating the identification risks of all synthesizers. We assume the intruder has an external file with information on {Gender, Age, Region} for each of the n = 6208 CUs. The intersecting values of these known-to-intruder predictors produces 40 known patterns, and each pattern has more than 1 CUs (i.e. no pattern with singletons). For all three synthesizers, we let K = 50, the maximum number of clusters. We estimate our synthesizers using Stan (Stan Development Team, 2016) and assess convergence by measuring the effective sample size (ESS). We include our Stan script in the Supplementary Material.
We generate L = 20 synthetic datasets for each synthesizer. We next evaluate and compare the profiles of identification risks and utility for all synthesizers.
Identification risks
Side-by-side violin plots of the identification risk probability distributions for the three synthesizers are presented in Figure 3 . For comparison, we include the risk profile of the confidential CE sample, labeled as "Data". The unweighted synthesizer is labeled as "Synthesizer". The two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers are labeled as "Marginal" and "Pairwise", corresponding to the marginal and pairwise downweight frameworks, respectively. We will use these labels -Synthesizer, Marginal and Pairwise -in the remainder of the paper to refer these downweight frameworks. However, the Pairwise has not fully resolved the whack-a-mole phenomenon, though it has notably lessened it. Figure 5 depicts a scatterplot highlighting the whack-a-mole phenomenon in the Pairwise. Compared to that in the Marginal in Figure 4 , the whack-a-mole phenomenon in the Pairwise is less severe, as can be seen by the overall smaller values on the y-axis of the highlighted CUs (whose identification risk has increased by 0.25 from the Synthesizer to the Pairwise). We also observe in Figure 5 that there are fewer CUs with higher than 0.5 identification risk in the Pairwise than in the Marginal, a feature that also reduces the tail length in the identification risk distribution violin plot shown in Figure 3 .
Utility
To evaluate utility, we report the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of several key summary statistics: the mean, the median, and the 90% quantile of the family income variable, estimated from the collection of L = 20 synthetic datasets drawn from each synthesizer (Synthesizer, Marginal and Pairwise) and presented in Table 2 through Table 4 . In addition, in Table 5 , we report the regression coefficient of Earner 2, in a regression analysis of family income on three predictors, {Region, Urban, Earner}. In each table, the "Data" row corresponds to the point estimate and the 95% confidence interval based on the confidential CE sample; the "Synthesizer", "Marginal", and "Pairwise" rows correspond to the point estimates and the bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for the three synthesizers. All four tables show high level preservation of utility by the Synthesizer. Yet, while Figure 3 reveals that the Synthesizer substantially reduces the risk distribution compared to the Data, the Synthesizer still produces an average marginal probability of identification risk of 25%, which may be deemed as too high by the BLS. Additional risk reduction is offered by the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, but at the cost of some loss of utility in their synthetic datasets. The utility results in Table 2 through Table 5 show that such privacy protection comes at a probably unacceptable utility reduction in the Marginal: none of the 95% credible interval contains the point estimate from the Data.
The Pairwise, by contrast, also expresses some utility reduction, though the reduction is very minor such that inference is unchanged and much less than that of the Marginal, while yet producing a similarly-reduced risk distribution, which is a notable reduction from the Synthesizer, shown in Figure 3 . Based on these results, we recommend the Pairwise to the BLS as a solution that offers further privacy protection while maintaining a reasonably high level of utility preservation. In summary, the Pairwise offers further privacy protection, compared to the unweighted Synthesizer. The extra privacy protection comes at the cost of a minor level of utility reduction. Overall, the Pairwise creates a better balance of utilityrisk trade-off, compared to the Marginal. It is worth noting that we also examined three-way identification risk probabilities to assess whether further improvement in the whack-a-mole phenomenon was observed, but discovered little improvement at the price of a less scalable computation.
We now turn to methods of additional weights adjustments to improve the level of utility preservation with acceptable loss of privacy protection. The following proposed strategies could allow the BLS and other statistical agencies to further tune the riskweighted pseudo posterior synthesizers to achieve their desired utility-risk trade-off.
Practical Approaches to Local Weights Adjustments
In Section 3, the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, the Marginal and the Pairwise, have been demonstrated to offer higher privacy protection, compared to the unweighted Synthesizer. The Pairwise gives better control of the overall risk profile and the tail of the record-level identification risk distribution by compression, while maintaining a high level of utility preservation. The Marginal, on the other hand, provides slightly lower privacy protection, with a bigger compromise on utility.
In this section, we assume that the BLS is satisfied with the privacy protection levels offered by the two risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, but not yet satisfied with their levels of utility preservation. We propose methods to increase their utility preservation levels, with acceptable loss of the privacy protection. We now proceed to describe the two strategies for creating such utility-risk trade-off balance. We focus on the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer, due to its superior performance in the trade-off between utility and risk performances, offering notably better risk protection than the Synthesizer for slightly reduced utility.
Results of the Marginal risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer are included in the Supplementary Material for brevity, and a short discussion is presented at the end of this section.
Two Local Weights Adjustments Strategies
The first strategy relates to the scaling constant c to be applied to the final pairwise probability-based weights, repeated in Equation (12). We earlier noted this scaling constant c serves as a tuning parameter for the BLS to control the amount of down-weighting of all CUs. For example, for CU i withα i = 0.5, when increasing c = 1 to c = 1.5, we have increased the final pairwise weight of this CU, α pw i , from 1×0.5 = 0.5 to 1.5 × 0.5 = 0.75, which translates to a decrease of the amount of downweighting of 0.25. Increasing the pairwise weight will increase the likelihood contribution of CU i in the corresponding risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer, and is expected to result in higher level of utility preservation.
In the limit of increasing c under the setup of Equation (12) Another approach to adjusting the pairwise weights applies a constant with equal effect on the final pairwise weights of all CUs. This can be done through adding a constant g in the final pairwise weights construction, as in Equation (13). Figure 8 illustrates the case with g = 0.1 while keeping c = 1. Compared to Figure 6 , the pairwise weight of every CU is increased by 0.1 in Figure 8 , showing that the effect of g is equally applied to the final pairwise weight of each CU, because the additive constant, g, shifts the distribution of by-record identification risks. A positive g increases the likelihood contribution of all CUs by the same amount, and is expected to result in higher level utility preservation, as every weight is closer to 1 than before.
It is important to note that when setting c = 1 and g = 0.0 in Equation (13),
we obtain the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizer in the application in Section 3. Figure 6 illustrates this basic setup, and we can observe how utilizing the pairwise identification risk probabilities to construct weights produces a selective downweighting of CUs as compared to the unweighted Synthesizer where every CU receives a weight of 1. The majority of the CUs under the Pairwise shown in Figure   6 receive weights around 0.25, with just a few CUs having weights of 1 and many
CUs with large or extremely large family income values having weights as low as 0.1.
We utilize the marginal and pairwise weights that adjust the unweighted Synthesizer in order to achieve a relatively large or global effect on the utility-risk trade-off. The further tuning of the marginal or pairwise weights using c and g are designed to induce a relatively small or local effect on the resulting by-record weights to allow a more precise setting of the utility-risk trade-off balance sought by the statistical agency. A greater-than-1 value of c has a stretching effect on the distribution of the (pairwise or marginal) weights, while a positive value of g induces an upward shift in the weight distribution. It is possible to tune c and g at the same time. For simplicity and illustration purpose, we evaluate tuning only one of these two parameters.
It bears mention that one may set c < 1 and g < 0 in the case the statistical agency desires to locally adjust the risks further downward. We focused on the inverse case of allowing a bit more risk to improve utility because it is the situation faced by the BLS on the CE sample data.
We now turn to the utility and identification risk profiles of the risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers with these local weights adjustments.
Utility and Risk Profiles under Local Weights Adjustments
For the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers, we consider three variations of the final pairwise weights in Equation (13): i) c = 1; ii) c = 1.5; and iii) g = 0.1. The choice of the radius r, the assumption of intruder's knowledge, and the configurations of the synthesis, stay the same as in Section 3. As before, we keep the results of the confidential CE sample, and the unweighted Synthesizer, for comparison.
With increased weights through greater-than-1 values of c or positive values of g, we expect to see increased utility preservation by the Pairwise risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers with these local weights adjustments. We report point estimates and 95% confidence intervals of several key summary statistics and a regression coefficient, from Table 6 to Table 9 . These utility results suggest that setting g = 0.1 offers improvement in all utility measures, compared to setting c = 1. To find out whether such utility improvement comes at a price of reduced privacy protection, we create violin plots to show the identification risk probability distributions in Figure 9 . The violin plots show different impacts on identification risks when setting c = 1.5 or g = 0.1, compared to when setting c = 1. Increasing c slightly increases the average identification risks (the horizontal bar), while producing a slightly shorter tail, indicating a better control of the maximum identification risks. Increasing g, on the other hand, keeps a similar average identification risks, while producing a longer tail, indicating a worse control of the maximum identification risks. Both c and g provide higher privacy protection compared to the unweighted Synthesizer, in terms of the average and the tail. 
Conclusion
We propose a general framework for statistical agencies to achieve desired utility-risk trade-off balance, when disseminating microdata through synthetic data. Starting with a synthesizer with high utility but unacceptable level of identification risks, statistical agencies can proceed to create risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers to provide higher privacy protection. Our proposed risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers are designed based on record-indexed weight, α i ∈ [0, 1], which is inversely proportional to the record-level identification risk probability. The likelihood contribution of each record is exponentiated with the record-indexed weight, and the resulted pseudo posterior creates the risk-weighted synthesizer, which downweights the likelihood contribution of records with high identification risks, providing higher privacy protection.
The agencies can utilize marginal identification risk probabilities, which treat records independent from each other. When risk-weighted pseudo posterior synthesizers based on the marginal identification risk probabilities do not provide sufficient privacy protection, especially when records with low identification risks are exposed to less privacy protection due to the whack-a-mole phenomenon, the statistical agen-cies may utilize pairwise identification risk probabilities in designing the by-record weights. These pairwise identification risk probabilities tie pairs of records together and induces dependence among the by-record weights, which offers an overall higher privacy protection and mitigates the whack-a-mole phenomenon, to some degree. To offer more flexibility in tuning the risk-utility tradeoff, we propose minor, local adjustments to weights. These adjustments to the weights should be relatively small in order to not distort the risk profile achieved using the Pairwise method of downweighting.
Our application to the CE sample shows that the Pairwise downweight framework 
where c and g are constants to tune the amount of weighting of all CUs. 
Marginal weights plots

